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Abstract
Should the central bank act to prevent ￿excessive￿asset price dy-
namics or should it wait until the boom spontaneously turns into a
crash and intervene afterwards to attenuate the the fallout on the real
economy? The standard "three equation" New Keynesian framework
is inadequate to analyse this issue for the very simple reason that as-
set prices are not explicitly included in the model. There are two
straightforward ways to take into account asset price dynamics in this
framework. First of all, the objective function of the central bank ￿
usually de￿ned in terms of in￿ ation and the output gap ￿could be
￿augmented￿ to take into account asset price in￿ ation. Second, ex-
pected asset price in￿ ation can a⁄ect the IS curve through a wealth
e⁄ect. In this paper we follow a di⁄erent route. In our model in fact,
the expected asset price dynamics will be eventually incorporated into
1the NK Phillips curve. This is due to the assumption of a cost chan-
nel for monetary policy which is activated whenever monetary policy
a⁄ects asset prices and dividends. In fact they determine the cost of ex-
ternal ￿nance in the simple "equity only" ￿nancing model we consider,
abstracting for simplicity from internal funds and the credit market.
We analyze the design and the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy in this simpli￿ed setting, both in the case of an instrument rule
(with or without a feedback from asset prices) and in the case of opti-
mal monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
Should the central bank prevent ￿excessive￿ asset price dynamics raising
interest rates to halt a Stock market boom or a bubble in house prices or
should it wait until the boom spontaneously turns into a crash and intervene
afterwards to attenuate the pains of the market adjustment and the fallout
on the real economy?
The debate over this crucial issue is at least a decade old ￿if we date it
from the Bernanke-Gertler (1999) vs Cecchetti et al. (2000) exchange ￿but
it has not settled yet, expecially in the light of the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis.
4The standard framework to analyse the transmission mechanism and the
optimal design of monetary policy, i.e. the "three equation" New Keynesian
(NK) DSGE framework is of course too simple and therefore inadequate to
analyse this issue for the very good reason that asset prices do not show up
anywhere in the model.
In order to make the model operational from this viewpoint, asset prices
should be explicitly included in the macroeconomic model of interest. There
have been many insightful attempts in this direction (Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1999; Bean, 2004; Carlstrom and Fuerst 2007; Gilchrist and Saito,
2006; Iacoviello, 2005; Monacelli, 2006; Airaudo, Nistic￿ and Zanna, 2007;
Santoro and Pfajfar, 2007; De Grauwe, 2009 to name just a few) but there
is much room for improvement in our opinion.
So far, two approaches have been adopted in the literature to take into
account asset price dynamics. First of all, the objective function of the
central bank ￿usually de￿ned in terms of in￿ ation and the output gap ￿
could be ￿augmented￿to take into account asset price in￿ ation. This is for
instance the route followed by Cecchetti (2000).
Second, asset price in￿ ation can show up as a factor "augmenting" the
IS curve. In fact an asset price shock can impact on the macroeconomy
basically through two channels: (i) a Tobin q e⁄ect on investment expendi-
ture; (ii) a wealth e⁄ect on consumption and/or on investment. The wealth
e⁄ect on investment takes the form of a net worth or balance sheet e⁄ect. In
both cases, the asset price shock a⁄ects aggregate demand and leads to an
"Augmented" (optimizing) IS curve. This is essentially the route followed
by Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist ￿who emphasize the net worth e⁄ect ￿and
5Airaudo-Nistic￿-Zanna, who stress the role of the wealth e⁄ect on consump-
tion. The impact of asset price changes on in￿ ation is only indirect through
changes in demand driven output gap changes.
In this paper we follow a di⁄erent route. In our model in fact, the
expected asset price dynamics will be eventually incorporated into the NK
Phillips curve. This is due to the assumption of a cost channel for monetary
policy (Walsh and Ravenna, 2006) which is activated whenever monetary
policy a⁄ects asset prices and dividends. The latter in fact are the cost of
external ￿nance in our model.
In simpli￿ed economy we consider, in fact, ￿rms have to anticipate wages
to workers before they can cash in sales proceeds. Therefore they need
funds at the moment wages have to be paid. For simplicity, we assume that
￿rms do not accumulate internal funds and have to issue new equities to
raise external ￿nance ("equity only" ￿nancing). The novelty of the analysis
consists in a peculiar treatment of ￿nancing decisions, which aims at bringing
to the fore the relationship between pricing of goods and pricing of assets.
In the end we obtain an "Augmented" NK Phillips curve. The impact
of asset price changes on in￿ ation is in this case direct through changes in
the cost structure of the corporate sector. In a sense this is a variant of the
cost channel NK-DSGE model. While in Ravenna-Walsh monetary policy
impacts on in￿ ation directly because the interest rate is a determinant of the
￿rm￿ s cost, in our setting the cost channel is activated indirectly whenever
monetary policy a⁄ects ￿through changes in the interest rate ￿asset price
in￿ ation.
In this context, optimal monetary policy should take into account asset
6price dynamics, essentially because it signals future changes in in￿ ation. In a
sense, we are exactly in the conditions emphasized by Bernanke and Gertler:
"... policy should not respond to changes in asset prices, except insofar as
they signal changes in expected in￿ation..." (emphasis added).
The toy economy we consider is of course a far cry from reality. For
reasons of tractability and as a very preliminary step towards a more sat-
isfactory ￿and necessarily more complicated ￿setting, in fact, we abstract
from a wide range of crucial imperfections of ￿nancial markets. The im-
plications of the model, however, are surprisingly far reaching. We analyse
the design and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in three
regimes:(a) an instrument rule with no-reaction to asset prices (IR-NAP),
(b) an instrument rule with reaction to asset prices (IR-RAP) and (c) an
optimal monetary policy rule (OR). In cases (a) and (c), by construction,
monetary policy does not respond to asset prices. This is essentially due
to the fact that the model has a built in tendency to dichotomize into 2
independent subsystems (one for output, in￿ ation and the interest rate and
the other for asset prices). In case (b) this tendency is overcome by the
explicit consideration of asset prices as an argument of the "Augmented"
Taylor rule.
In the case of a supply shock, the policy prescription and the transmission
mechanism are qualitatively the same both with an instrument rule and
with in an optimal monetary policy setting. The central bank is "leaning
against the wind": the interest rate goes up, asset prices fall, the output gap
turns negative, the return on shares increases. The magnitude of the e⁄ect,
however, is indeed di⁄erent. When the central bank takes into account asset
7prices ￿i.e. in the IR-RAP case ￿the impact of the shock on both in￿ ation
and the output gap is milder than in the IR-NAP. In the OR case, if the
central banker is su¢ ciently "hard nosed", a supply shock can even turn
into a de￿ ationary shock.
The results are even more intriguing in the case of a demand shock. The
same (demand) shock has opposite e⁄ects on the output gap. In the IR
regime, it has a positive e⁄ect ￿as we are led to think in a standard short
run macro setting ￿while in the OR regime it has a negative e⁄ect. When
the central bank takes into account also asset prices, i.e.in the IR-RAP case,
output grows more than in the IR-NAP case but in￿ ation will be milder.
Our simpli￿ed model, therefore, can account for a wide range of possible
real world outcomes. We consider these results as an encouragement to
enrich the model to explore more realistic environments.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe households￿
and ￿rms￿decision rules. Section 4 is devoted to the determination of the
￿ ex-price equilibrium. The log-linearization around the steady state is car-
ried out in section 5. In section 6 we derive the Augmented NK Phillips
curve. In section 7 we evaluate the impact of a Taylor type instrument
rule for monetary policy,with and without asset prices. We design optimal
monetary policy in section 8. In section 9 we derive the optimal in￿ ation
targeting rule. We compare the results in the IR vs. OR regime in section
10. Finally, in section 11 we study the properties of the model (under di⁄er-
ent rules for dividends) in terms of stability and learnability in an adaptive
learning environment ￿ la Evans and Honkapojia. Section 12 concludes.
82 Households
The economy is populated by households and ￿rms. The former decide
on consumption, asset holdings (money, bonds, shares) and labour supply.
The latter produce di⁄erentiated goods in a monopolistic setting ￿ la Dixit-
Stiglitz, using only labour as an input. Pricing decisions are characterized
by Calvo type nominal rigidity. Therefore there are ￿ve markets: labor,
goods, money, bonds, shares.
There is a continuum of unit mass of in￿nitely lived identical house-
holds which discount the future at the factor ￿. Period by period utility is















where ￿, ￿, ￿;￿;￿ are positive parameters with the usual interpretation, Ct
is a CES aggregator of consumption goods,1 mt := Mt=Pt are real money
balances 2 and Nt represents hours worked. Real money balances show up
in the utility function because they provide liquidity services.
The households￿ portfolio consists of money, bonds and shares. The
nominal value in t of money balances (resp. Government bonds) carried
1Ct consists of di⁄erentiated consumption goods produced by monopolistically com-










with e > 1 governs the price elasticity of demand of each good.







9over from the past is denoted by Mt￿1 (Bt￿1): Moreover the household
owns At￿1 shares, whose price is Qt: In period t the household receives a
￿ ow of interest payments on Government bonds it￿1Bt￿1 where it￿1 is the
nominal interest rate decided upon in t-1. Moreover we assume that ￿rms
pay in t (nominal) dividends equal to Dt per share (more on this in a while)
held in t-1.
The household employs "resources" consisting of wage income, interest
payments, and dividends to consume and increase money, bond and share-
holdings according to the following budget constraint in real terms:
Ct +mt +bt +qtAt = wtNt +
1
1 + ￿t
[mt￿1 + (1 + it￿1)bt￿1]+(qt + dt)At￿1
(1)
where bt := Bt=Pt are real bond holdings;qt := Qt=Pt is the real price of
each share (asset price or Stock price for short in the following);wt := Wt=Pt
is the real wage; ￿t :=
Pt
Pt￿1
￿ 1 is the in￿ ation rate and dt are dividends
per share.
Liquidity injections (withdrawals) are implemented (by the central bank)
by means of open market purchases (sales) of bonds: Mt￿Mt￿1 = ￿[Bt ￿ (1 + it￿1)Bt￿1]:Taking
into account this procedure, the budget constraint of the representative
household boils down to: PtCt+Qt (At ￿ At￿1) = WtNt+DtAt￿1 Recalling
that QtAt = WtNt it turns out that
PtCt = (Qt + Dt)At￿1 (2)




















subject to a sequence of budget constraints of the form (1). From the ￿rst
order conditions (see the appendix for details) one can derive the usual
optimal relations, i.e. the consumption Euler equations for consumption,























t = wt (6)





Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
qt
(7)
Equation (7) establishes the equality between the return on bonds, i.e.
the real interest rate, and the return on equities, i.e. the sum of the dividend
yield and the capital gain (in real terms). By simple algenra, this condition
11can be turned into an asset price equation:
qt =
Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
1 + it
(1 + Et￿t+1) (8)
Consolidating the No-arbitrage condition and the Consumption Euler
equation we get:
C￿￿
t qt = ￿EtC￿￿
t+1 (qt+1 + dt+1) (9)
This optimality condition states the equality between the marginal util-
ity the agent gives up by saving in order to purchase one share and the
present value of the marginal utility the agent will gain one period ahead by
transforming into consumption the dividend and the capital gain the share
yields.
3 Firms
As in the standard New Keynesian model the corporate sector consists of J
￿rms, indexed by j; which produce di⁄erentiated goods in a monopolistically
competitive setting ￿ la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) using only labour.Therefore
￿rms incur only the production cost represented by the wage bill.
We depart from the standard setting in assuming the following
1. Production takes time. Technology is represented by the CRS produc-
tion function Yjt+1 = ZtNjt where Zt is a technological shock (uniform
across ￿rms). Since ￿rms hire workers in period t and sell output in
t+1, they cannot pay wages out of sales proceeds: at the beginning of
each period they have to anticipate the wage bill to employees.
122. No internal funds: ￿rms do not accumulate internal ￿nance so that
the ￿nancing gap coincides with the wage bill. They have to raise
external ￿nance to ￿ll the ￿nancing gap.
In order to concentrate on the role of asset prices in macroeconomic
performance, we adopt the following simplifying shortcut:
3. "Equity only" ￿nancing: there is only one source of external funds,
the Stock market.
Assumptions 2. and 3. allow us to get rid, in the following, of the
complications due to the accumulation of net worth and to ignore the credit
market. This is patently unrealistic. We consider the present framework as
only a ￿rst step towards a more satisfactory and realistic model.
From the "equity only" ￿nancing assumption, follows that the j-th ￿rm
raises funds issuing new shares and the amount of shares sold is equal to the
wage bill: 3
wtNjt = qtAjt (10)
4. Dividend and buy-back policy: Shareholders are remunerated by means
of dividends (distributed in t+1 on shares held in t), which represent
the cost of external funds for the ￿rms. Furthermore ￿rms buy back
all the shares outstanding in t+1.
3In principle, each ￿rm issues its own shares so that there should be an entire range of
heterogeneous asset prices, one for each ￿rm. In order to simplify the argument, we will
impose from the start the symmetry among ￿rms which is built-in the model and assume
that the asset price is uniform across equity-issuing ￿rms:Alternatively, one can think of
q as the average Stock market index and assume that each individual share prices qj is
not too far from the average. In the end, however, ￿rms will behave uniformly, so that
the individual share price will coincide with the average.
13The time schedule can be summarized as follows. At the beginning of
period t, the ￿rm issues equities and uses the proceeds to hire workers and
start production. Since production takes an entire period, output will be
available for sale in t+1. Sale proceeds are used in t+1 to pay dividends and
buy back shares issued in t. In fact, as shown above ￿see (2) ￿Pt+1Ct+1 =
(Qt+1 + Dt+1)At:At the beginning of period t+1, the cycle starts again.
In the end, therefore, we are assuming that in the same period (t+1) the
￿rm is paying dividends and reimbursing shareholders for the shares they
bought in t and it is issuing new equities to ￿nance production in t+1. This
is clearly unrealistic but simpli￿es the analysis to a great extent.
The ￿rm￿ s total disbursement occur in t+1 but are related to operat-
ing costs incurred in t. The ￿rm￿ s total cost in real terms, therefore, is
TCjt = Et (qt+1 + dt+1)Ajt: 4Substituting (10) into this expression we ob-
tain: TCj =
Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
qt
wtNjt:Hence the real marginal cost is:
￿t =






Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
qt
= ROS




; the marginal cost must be augmented by a term which
represents the cost of external ￿nance for the ￿rm. This, in turn, coincides
4Since disbursement will occur one period ahead, in t the ￿rm has to form expectations
on the total gross return in t+1 of each share issued in t. This gross return in real terms
if the sum of the asset price and dividends in t+1.









As in the original New Keynesian framework, in a symmetric ￿exprice equi-
librium all the ￿rms charge the same price Pt equal to a markup ￿ > 1 over
nominal marginal cost Pt￿t.5. Therefore ￿t =
1
￿





Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
(12)
Log-linearizing around the steady state (s.s.) and denoting s.s. values
with the suscript s and percent deviations from the s.s. with a hat, from
the equation above we derive:
^ wt = ^ Zt ￿
h








is the inverse of the s.s. ROS, which is equal to the discount factor (see
below).6 Equation (13) is the price rule in the present context. It is repre-
5The mark-up, in turn, depends on price elasticity: ￿ =
e
e￿1:
In the optimum, in period the ￿rm charges a price Pt which is a multiple of the
contemporaneous marginal cost evaluated at prices of period t: Pt￿t. The real mar-





Zt :Sales proceeds in t will then be used to validate commitments to-
wards shareholders originated in t-1 (see (2)).
6The expression ￿Et^ qt+1 +(1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿i.e. the weighted sum of the percent devia-
tions of dividends and the future asset price. is equal to the percent deviation of the sum
15Figure 1: Price rule and wage rule
sented by the black horizontal line in ￿gure 1. The grey line is the price rule
in the canonical CGG model, whose equation is ^ wt = ^ Zt:
The expression
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt = [ ROS (14)
is the deviation of the ROS from the s.s.
In order to derive the wage rule, we start from the optimality condition
(6), which states that the real wage should be equal to the marginal rate of
substitution between labour and leisure. Plugging the goods market equilib-
rium condition Ct = Yt and the labour requirement function Nt = Yt=Zt into
of dividends and future asset price, i.e. Et
￿
\ qt+1 + dt+1
￿
:









Log-linearizing around the steady state we get:
^ wt = (￿ + ￿) ^ Yt ￿ ￿ ^ Zt (16)
This is the wage rule, represented by the upward sloping black line in
￿gure 1. The wage rule is the same as in the canonical model.
Equating (13) and (16) we obtain the ￿ exprice equilibrium deviation of
output from the s.s.
^ Y
f





￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
i
(17)
where ^ Y c
t =
1+￿
￿+￿ ^ Zt is the ￿ exprice equilibrium in the standard (canonical)
NK model.From ￿gure 1 it is clear that when [ ROS is positive: (i) ^ Y
f
t < ^ Y c
t
i.e. the ￿ exprice equilibrium is smaller than in the canonical case, and (ii)
^ wt < ^ wc
t = ^ Zt ￿see (13) ￿i.e. the real wage is smaller than in the standard
case. The reason why both the real wage and output (in log deviations)
are smaller in the present context is simple: The ROS represents the cost
of external ￿nance for the ￿rm. In the presence of this additional cost, the
￿rm is producing less at a higher price (a lower real wage).
175 Steady states and log-linearization
The economy consists of ￿ve markets: labor, goods, money, bonds, shares.
The equilibrium condition on the goods market is Ct = Yt:Moreover, Yt =
ZtNt:Imposing the s.s. condition in (4), it turns out that
1 + it
1 + Et￿t+1
= ￿￿1 = 1 + r (18)
i.e. in the steady state the real interest rate is anchored to the rate of time
preference r.




= ￿￿1 ￿ 1 = r (19)
i.e. in the s.s. the dividend yield is constant and equal to the rate of time
preference. From the equation above follows qs = ds=r i.e. a pure dividend
discount model of asset price determination: in the steady state, the asset
price is the discounted sum of an in￿nite stream of dividends.







= 1 + r
This is obvious: Because of the no-arbitrage condition, the real interest rate
should be equal to the ROS.










Et (qt+1 + dt+1)
! 1
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: In the present




From the consumption Euler equation (4) through linearization aroud
the s.s. and taking into account the equilibrium condition Ct = Yt we get




For the sake of comparison with the standard NK-DSGE model, we rewrite
the equation above as
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + gt (21)
where xt denotes the output gap, de￿ned as the di⁄erence between cur-
rent output and ￿ exprice equilibrium output in the canonical model, i.e.
xt := ^ Yt ￿ ^ Y c
t . Equation (21) represents the optimizing IS curve. We have
appended a demand shock to the IS curve . As usual gt follows an AR(1)
19process:gt =  gt￿1 + e gt with e gt ￿iid(0;￿2
g).
From the asset price equation (8) through linearization we get the Asset
Price (AP) schedule:
^ qt = ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) +
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1
i
(22)
6 The ￿augmented￿NK Phillips curve
From the linearization of (11) around the s.s. we get
^ ￿t = ^ wt ￿ ^ Zt +
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
i
Plugging (16) into the expression above and rearranging we get:






￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
i￿
(23)
where xt is the output gap as de￿ned in the canonical New Keynesian
framework.
In each period a fraction ! of ￿rms is unable to adjust its price. As
usual in a Calvo pricing context, therefore, ! is a measure of the degree of



























Ct+s = cjt is demand for the j-th ￿rm￿ s product and ￿t is the
20marginal (and average) cost.
The optimal relative price of the good produced by the adjusting ￿rm in
period t, therefore, takes into account the stream of future marginal costs,
which, in our framework, depends on current and future asset prices and
dividends (see (11)).
From the standard microfoundations of the NK Phillips curve, after lin-
earization we get ￿t = k^ ￿t + ￿Et￿t+1:Substituting (23) and rearranging we
get
￿t = ￿xt + k
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
i
+ ￿Et￿t+1 + ut (24)
with ￿ := k(￿ + ￿):Equation (24) is the NK Phillips curve in the new
setting. We have appended a supply shock ut to the NK Phillips curve
in order to avoid the "divine coincidence". As usual ut follows an AR(1)
process:ut = ￿ut￿1 + e ut with e ut ￿iid(0;￿2
u).
The di⁄erence w.r.t. the canonical NK-PC is the term in brackets, i.e.
[ ROS (see equation (14). In fact, the cost channel and the equity-only ￿-
nancing assumptions imply that the cost of external ￿nance, which coincides
with the ROS, is a⁄ecting the ￿rms￿pricing decisions and therefore in￿ ation.
This is the reason why we will de￿ne the equation above the Augmented New
Keynesian-Phillips Curve (A-NKPC).
217 An instrument rule for monetary policy
We will ￿rst explore the design and the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy in the case in which the central bank adopts a simple Taylor-type
instrument rule. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality,
let￿ s assume that this rule is activated exclusively by the feedback from
in￿ ation (in other words, the central bank does not take into account the
output gap in devising its policy). Hence, the rule is it = r + ￿￿￿t where r
is the real interest rate (equal to the rate of time preference in the steady
state). In the following, in order to get rid of unnecessary complications, we
will ignore the real interest rate so that the instrument rule becomes
it = ￿￿￿t (25)
This is the simplest rule one can imagine. In subsection 7.2 we will
consider an instrument rule augmented by the asset price.
7.1 Model I-1
The macroeconomic model in structural form consists of the No-Arbitrage
Condition (22), Augmented NK Phillips curve (24), IS curve (21) and Taylor
rule (25) which we reproduce here for the reader￿ s convenience.
^ qt = ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) +
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1
i
￿t = ￿xt + k
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
i
+ ￿Et￿t+1 + ut
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + gt
it = ￿￿￿t
(M I-1)
22This is "model I-1", a system of four linear di⁄erence equations in ￿ve
state variables, xt; ^ qt;￿t;it; ^ dt:
Model I-1 therefore is incomplete: There is one degree of freedom in
modelling the macroeconomy in the present setting, which we can exploit
to specify the dynamic pattern of dividends. 7 We will specify the dividend
policy of ￿rms in sections ....
The system above is recursive. Using the no-arbitrage condition, in fact,
we obtain:
￿t = ￿xt + k(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + ￿Et￿t+1 + ut (M I-0)
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + gt
it = ￿￿￿t
These equations form "model I-0", a system of three equations in xt;￿t;it:
Notice that we can solve for these variables without any reference to [ ROS
and therefore to asset prices and dividends. In fact, we have replaced [ ROS
with the real interest rate it￿Et￿t+1, exploiting the no-arbitrage condition.
In other words
Remark 1 If the economy is described by model I-1 the determination of
the asset price and dividends can be separated from the determination of all
the other state variables. The equilibrium values of xt;￿t;it: can be logi-
cally determined by solving model I-0 before determining asset prices and
7We will not get entangled at this stage of the analysis in the debate on the dividend
puzzle and simply borrow from the real world the stylized fact that ￿rms do pay dividends
even if the reasons for this behavior are not exactly clear.
23dividends.
The Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) of model I-0 is computed
in appendix B. In the following we illustrate the transmission of shocks
within model I-0 by means of simple diagrams.
In order to do so, notice ￿rst that from (21), recalling that ￿ = 1=￿
follows that it ￿ Et￿t+1 = ￿ (Etxt+1 ￿ xt + gt):Second, notice that in order
to solve the system by the method of undetermined coe¢ cient, we guess
s1 = s1ut + s2gt for each state variable s = ￿;x;i. Therefore Etst+1 =
s1￿ut + s2 gt.
Assumption 1. Let￿ s assume, for the sake of discussion, that ￿ =  :
This assumption is of course restrictive and may entail a modest loss of
generality. It greatly simpli￿es the calculations, however, and yields very
neat results since Etst+1 = ￿(s0ut + s1gt) = ￿st for each and every state
variable.
Because of assumption 1, the RE of a state variable taken in t for t+1 is
a fraction of the current value of the variable. The expected rate of change
therefore is decreasing with the current value: Etst+1 ￿ st = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)st:
This implicitly determines a mean reverting behaviour of that variable. If a
shock hits a variable, causing a departure from the s.s., a negative (stabiliz-
ing) feedback is activated.
From assumption 1 follows that Etxt+1 = ￿xt;Et￿t+1 = ￿￿t. Hence the
real interest rate is
it ￿ Et￿t+1 = (￿￿ ￿ ￿)￿t (26)










1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k(￿￿ ￿ ￿)
xt +
1
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k(￿￿ ￿ ￿)
ut (28)
Equation (27) represents the AD schedule in the present setting. Equa-
tion (28) represents the AS schedule.
Assumption 2. We assume




The inequality on the LHS of (29) is the equivalent, in the present setting, of
the Taylor principle: in fact it assures that the real interest rate is positive
when there is a burst of in￿ ation (and viceversa). Thanks to the Taylor
principle, the AD schedule is downward sloping on the (xt;￿t) plane. The
inequality on the RHS of (29) assures, on the other hand, that the AS
schedule is upward sloping.When the AD and the AS curves are well behaved
(i.e. they have the "appropriate slopes"), the solutions of M I-0 make sense
(the system is "viable"). This means that
Remark 2 The reaction of the central bank to current in￿ation must be
neither too weak (Taylor principle: ￿ < ￿￿) nor too strong (￿￿ < ￿ +
1 ￿ ￿￿
k
) to assure the viability of the model solution.
The RHS of (29) is the truly novel feature of this setting. In the absence
of the cost channel, in fact, model M I-0 would boild down to the canonical
25model which we will label M I-0(c):
￿t = ￿xt + ￿Et￿t+1 + ut
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + gt
it = ￿￿￿t
(M I-0(c))















Hence only ￿ < ￿￿ must be assumed to assure that the AD curve is down-
ward sloping; the AS curve in model M I-0(c) is upward sloping for any
value of ￿￿.
Notice moreover that, as a consequence of the Taylor principle, the AS


















In a sense this is obvious. In fact, an increase in output (with respect to the





in the canonical model. In the presence of the cost channel, the reaction of
the central bank, i.e. the increase of the interest rate due to in￿ ation, will






Solving (27) (28) gives xt and ￿t as linear functions of the shocks. Sub-
stituting the solution for ￿t into (25) one gets the fundamentals based in-
26Figure 2: AS and AD schedules
strument rule (see again appendix B for details).
We are now ready to examine the transmission and the e⁄ects of shocks.
Suppose initially there are no shocks: gt = ut = 0. In ￿gure 2 we
represent the AD and the AS schedules in the present setting (black) and in
the canonical one (grey). In the absence of shocks in both settings the two
lines intersect in the origin, point A.
Suppose a (temporary) supply shock hits the economy. In a canonical
setting, in￿ ation goes up by
1
1 ￿ ￿￿
ut on impact (see point B in ￿gure 3).
In the presence of the cost channel, the reaction of the central bank to the
increase in in￿ ation ￿i.e. the increase of the interest rate ￿adds to in￿ ation
on impact. This is the reason why in￿ ation goes up by
1
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k(￿￿ ￿ ￿)
uton
impact in the presence of the cost channnel (see point B￿in ￿gure 3). In
other words, the AS curve augmented with the cost channel shifts up more
27Figure 3: E⁄ects of a supply shock
than in the canonical case.8
The central bank reaction steers the economy to C￿ . In the end, therefore,
there will be more in￿ ation an a more acute recession than in the canonical
case (compare with C). In the case of a supply shock, therefore, the cost
channel works as an ampli￿cation mechanism of the shock.9 Of course,
since the shock is temporary, with the passing of time the economy will
move back to point A.
In the case of a demand shock, the new (short run) equilibrium will be at
the intersection B￿as shown in ￿gure 4. The output gap turns positive but,
in the presence of the cost channel, the expansion is weaker and in￿ ation is
8It is easy to see, however, that the intercepts on the x-axis of the AS and AS(c)
schedules after the shock coincide.
9In fact, in the RE solution ￿the coe¢ cients of in￿ ation and the output gap w.r.t. the
supply shock are greater in absolute value in the presence of the cost channel. In symbols:
b1 > b
c
1, ja1j > ja
c
1j as shown in appendix B.
28Figure 4: E⁄ects of a demand shock
higher than in the canonical case (compare with B).
What happens to the stock price? As we said, since the system is recur-
sive we can solve for the asset price after having solved for the ouput gap,
in￿ ation and the interest rate. Suppose, as a very convenient special case,
that ￿rms do not distribute dividends. In this case [ ROS = Et^ qt+1 ￿ ^ qt i.e.
the deviation of ROS from the s.s. is equal to the deviation of the capital
gain from the s.s. 10 Notice that, because of assumption 1, Et^ qt+1 ￿ ^ qt =
￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ qt:Using this de￿nition in (22) we get:




10It is easy to see that this di⁄erence is the expected (real) asset price in￿ation, i.e. the
di⁄erence between (nominal) expected asset price in￿ ation Et’t :=
Qt
Qt￿1 ￿1 and expected
in￿ ation Et￿t :=
Pt
Pt￿1 ￿ 1. Hence: [ ROS = Et^ qt+1 ￿ ^ qt = Et’t ￿ Et￿t
29Hence, thanks to the Taylor principle, a burst of in￿ ation has a negative
impact on the asset price. This is, once again, in a sense obvious. When the
economy is hit by an in￿ ationary shock, the central bank raises the interest
rate prompting a ￿ ight from equities. Asset prices fall bringing about an
increase of the return on shares such as to match the increase of the interest
rate. This is how the no-arbitrage condition is re-established. Hence ^ q is
a linear decreasing function of g and u because they both bring about an
increase of in￿ ation. Both types of shocks therefore, are detrimental for the
Stock market.
7.2 Model I-2
Let￿ s consider now an augmented interest rate rule for monetary policy which
takes into account not only in￿ ation but also the asset price deviation from
the s.s.
it = ￿￿￿t + ￿q^ qt (33)
In this case, the macroeconomic model in structural form consists of
equations (22), (24), (21) and (33). For the sake of discussion, let￿ s assume
away the problem of providing at least a behavioral assumption for dividends
con￿ning ourselves to the very convenient scenario in which ￿rms do not pay
30out dividends. In this special case the model becomes:
^ qt = ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + Et^ qt+1
￿t = ￿xt + k(Et^ qt+1 ￿ ^ qt) + ￿Et￿t+1 + ut
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + gt
it = ￿￿￿t + ￿q^ qt
(M I-2)
This is "model I-2", i.e. a system of four linear di⁄erence equations in
four state variables, xt; ^ qt;￿t;it:
This system is not recursive. In other words, when the central bank
reacts to the asset price, the system does not dichotomize into 2 independent
subsystems (one for xt;￿t;it and the other for ^ qt) as in model I-1. 11
The REE of model I-2 is computed in appendix ... In this new setting
the real interest rate is
it ￿ Et￿t+1 = (￿￿ ￿ ￿)￿t + ￿q^ qt (34)
In order to solve this model, it is convenient to plug (34) into (22). Using




= ￿￿, E^ q
0
= ￿^ q) we get










Hence, substituting (35) into M I-2 and using assumption 1, the system





1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k(￿￿ ￿ ￿)
xt +
k￿q
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k(￿￿ ￿ ￿)
^ qt +
1











^ qt = ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿
￿t
(M I-2bis)
Notice that asset prices impact directly on in￿ ation (see the ￿rst equa-
tion). These equations form a system in xt;￿t; ^ qt:Substituting the asset price
equation into the other equations we get:
xt = ￿
￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿)





















Equation (36) represents the AD schedule in model I-2. Equation (37)
represents the AS schedule.
Assumption 3. We assume







The inequality on the LHS of (38) is, of course, the Taylor principle. The
inequality on the RHS of (38) assures that the AS schedule is upward slop-
32Figure 5: Viability area
ing. As already noted in Remark 2 above, this means that the reaction of
the central bank to in￿ ation must not be too strong. In the present case,
moreover, it should ful￿ll an additional requirement concerning the sensitiv-
ity of monetary policy to asset prices. In ￿gure 5 we represent the viability
area in the presence of the cost channel. When the central bank does not
react to asset prices, viability is con￿ned to the area between the grey and
the black horizontal lines (i.e. the area that ful￿lls (29)). When the central
bank reacts to asset prices the viability area (i.e. the area that ful￿lls (38))
expands to the area between the upward sloping and the horizontal black
lines.
Notice that the AS schedule in the presence of reaction to asset prices is























In order to understand why, recall that, absent the cost channel, a posi-






the presence of the cost channel, the reaction of the central bank, i.e. the
increase of the interest rate due to in￿ ation, will make the increase of





. According to the third equation in
M I-2, asset prices go down as a consequence of in￿ ation. If the central
bank targets also asset prices, the contraction of the asset price will induce
a monetary easing, i.e. a reduction of the interest rate, which, in the
presence of the asset price cost channel, translates into a reduction of in￿ a-
tion. Overall, there will be an increase in the interest rate also in the case of
reaction to asset prices, but this increase will be smaller than in the case of
no reaction. Notice that the higher the reaction to asset prices, the ￿ atter
the AS curve becomes. As ￿q increases, the slope tends asymptotically to

















Notice moreover that when the central bank reacts to ^ qt also the slope


















1 + ￿q ￿ ￿
￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿)
34Figure 6: Slopes of the AD and AS curves
In words, the AD curve when ￿q > 0 is steeper ￿on the (xt;￿t) plane ￿
than in the case ￿q = 0: In order to understand why, recall that, in the case









. This is due to the reaction of the central
bank to in￿ ation, i.e. to the increase of the interest rate. In￿ ation leads
to a fall of asset prices (due to arbitrage). In the case ￿q > 0; the central
bank contrasts this tendency by "easing" a bit, i.e. reducing the interest
rate marginally w.r.t. the previous interest rate hike. This will make the








1 + ￿q ￿ ￿
.
In ￿gure 6 we report the AD and AS curves in the di⁄erent cases.
Solving (36) (37) gives xt and ￿t as linear functions of the shocks. Sub-
stituting the solution for ￿t into (33) one gets the fundamentals based in-
35strument rule (see again appendix ... for details)).
We are now ready to examine the transmission and the e⁄ects of shocks.
Suppose initially there are no shocks: gt = ut = 0. In ￿gure 6 we
represent the AD and the AS schedules in the case in which ￿q > 0 (AS(q)
in black) and in the case in which there is no reaction to the asset price (AS
in grey). In the absence of shocks in both settings the two lines intersect in
the origin, point A.
Suppose a supply shock hits the economy. In the no asset price reaction
case, in￿ ation goes up by
1
1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k(￿￿ ￿ ￿)
ut (see point B￿in ￿gure 7.2,
which corresponds to B￿in ￿gure 3). This burst of in￿ ation incorporates the
fact that the central bank reacts to the shock raising the interest rate, which
adds to in￿ ation on impact. The increase in in￿ ation makes asset prices go
down. When ￿q > 0; the central bank reacts to the fall of asset prices easing
a bit so that the increase of the interest rate ￿and the additional in￿ ation
36due to the cost channel ￿will be smaller than in the no reaction case. In
other words, targeting asset prices will reduce the impact on in￿ ation of a
contractionary monetary policy in the presence of the cost channel.
The central bank then steers the economy to C". Notice that the AD
curve is now steeper than in the no AP reaction. In the end, therefore, there
will be less in￿ ation and a milder recession than in the case in which the
central bank does not react to asset prices (compare with C￿ ). When a supply
shock hits the economy, therefore, the reaction of the central bank to asset
prices has a mitigating e⁄ect on both the change in output and in￿ ation,
curbing the ampli￿cation mechanism activated by the cost channel in the
no reaction case.
In the case of a demand shock, the new short run equilibrium will be
at the intersection B" as shown in ￿gure 4. The output gap turns positive.
But with the cost channel and the reaction to asset prices the expansion is
stronger and in￿ ation is higher than in the previous case. 12When a demand
shock hits the economy, therefore, the reaction of the central bank to asset
prices has a mitigating e⁄ect on in￿ ation, but an ampli￿cation mechanism
on output with respect to the no reaction case.




￿t while now ^ qt = ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿
1 + ￿q ￿ ￿
￿t. Hence, a burst of in￿ ation has a
negative impact on the asset price but smaller than in the previous case.In
fact, when the economy is hit by an in￿ ationary shock, asset prices fall.
12Points B￿and B" lie on an upward sloping straight line (not shown in the ￿gure), whose
equation ￿ i.e. (44) ￿is obtained by consolidating the Augmented NK-PC as de￿ned in
equation (41) and of the IS curve (42). We will refer to this curve as the Augmented
NK-PC in section 8).
37Figure 7: E⁄ect of a demand shock
When ￿q > 0; the central bank eases a bit mitigating the fall of asset prices.
8 Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section we turn our attention to the case in which monetary policy
is determined optimally. In order to do so we need to specify the central
bank￿ s preferences. We represent them by means of a quadratic loss function
whose arguments are the deviations of in￿ ation and the output gap from the
target values, which we can set to zero for simplicity.
The output gap which should show up in the loss function is the di⁄er-
ence between current output and the ￿ exprice equilibrium output as de￿ned
in the present context, i.e.￿ xt := ^ Yt ￿ ^ Y
f
t . Unless the central bank is myopic,
in fact, it is straightforward to assume that it wants to minimize the di⁄er-
38ence between current output and the relevant notion of ￿ exprice equilibrium
with reference to the economy under scrutiny.
There is an obvious relationship between the canonical notion of output
gap xt := ^ Yt ￿ ^ Y c
t and the relevant notion for the policy maker ￿ xt:
￿ xt = xt +
￿
^ Y c





￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
￿ + ￿














Hence [ ROS = ￿Et^ qt+s+1+(1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+s+1￿^ qt shows up in the loss func-
tion in a straightforward (non ad-hoc) way. In the canonical model, under
discretion, the loss is minimized subject only to the New Keynesian Phillips
curve assuming that agents￿expectations are given. In the present setting
the optimization problem is more complicated. Not only the (Augmented)
New Keynesian Phillips Curve but also the optimizing IS curve should play
the role of constraints in the optimization problem.
Therefore the intertemporal optimization problem boils down to a se-











s.t. ￿t = ￿xt ￿ k^ qt + C1
xt = ￿^ qt + C2
39where we treat expectations and shocks as given as it is customary in
the discretionary regime. Hence:













C1 : = ￿Et￿t+1 + k
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1
i
+ ut
C2 : = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1
i
+ gt
are treated as constants in the minimization problem. From the FOCs





￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
￿(￿ + ￿)
(39)
The ￿rst component of the RHS of (39) is exactly the same as in the
canonical Clarida-Gal￿-Gertler (CGG) model. In our setting, the SEP is
"augmented" by a factor proportional to [ ROS.13
8.1 Model O-1
The macroeconomic model in structural form consists of the Social Expan-
sion Path (39), Augmented NK Phillips curve (24), No-Arbitrage Condition
(22) and IS curve (21) which we reproduce here for the reader￿ s convenience.
13Notice, however, that [ ROS is equal to the real interest rate due to the No-arbitrage
condition and that the real interest rate is equal to
Etxt+1+gt￿xt
￿ . Taking these consider-
ations into account would yield a SEP whose slope in the end is di⁄erent with respect to





￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
￿(￿ + ￿)
^ qt = ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) +
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1
i
￿t = ￿xt + k
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
i
+ ￿Et￿t+1 + ut
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + gt
(M 0-1)
This is "model O-1", a system of four linear di⁄erence equations in ￿ve
state variables, xt; ^ qt;￿t;it; ^ dt:
For the moment we do not need to specify dividend policy for the very
good reason that the system is recursive. In fact, plugging (22) into (39),








￿t = ￿xt + k(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + ￿Et￿t+1 + ut (41)
These equations, together with (21) form "model O-0", a system of three
equations in xt;￿t;it:
Notice that we can solve for these variables without any reference to
[ ROS and therefore to asset prices and dividends.In other words we have the
14Plugging (22) into (21) we get:
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
i
+ gt
Since there is a negative relationship between [ ROS and the output gap, in the end the
current output gap is increasing with the current asset price. This positive relationship is
not new in the literature. The optimizing IS curve in fact may incorporate this positive
relationship due a wealth e⁄ect. However we obtain this result for entirely di⁄erent reasons:
The higher is ^ qt; the smaller will be [ ROS and correspondingly smaller, in equilibrium,
will be the real interest rate; the associated increase in consumption will boost output.
41same dichotomy as in model I-0 (see remark 1 above).
We assume, as in the previous section, that ￿ =   (assumption 1) so
that Etxt+1 = ￿xt;Et￿t+1 = ￿￿t: Hence, from the IS curve follows:
it ￿ Et￿t+1 = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)xt + gt (42)
Plugging (42)into the system above and rearranging we get:
xt = ￿
￿(￿ + ￿)
￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿t ￿
￿












Solving (43) (44) gives xt and ￿t as linear functions of the shocks. Sub-
stituting the solutions for xt and ￿t into (21) one gets the fundamentals
based optimal interest rate rule (see again appendix D for details).
For the sake of comparison, we recall that the standard CGG model


















15Notice that ^ ￿1 < 1.
42In this case the SEP of equation (43) ￿which we will label SEP-ABD ￿
is downward sloping and ￿ atter ￿on the (xt;￿t) plane ￿than the SEP in






















This means that for any given in￿ ation shock, the policy-induced recession
necessary to steer the macroeconomy on the optimal in￿ ation-output gap
locus is bigger in the present setting than in CGG. Moreover the SEP is
a⁄ected by demand shocks, which was not the case in CGG.
As to the Phillips curve, the Augmented NK-PC of equation (44) is
￿ atter than the NK-PC represented by (46). Moreover the the Augmented
NK-PC is a⁄ected by demand shocks, which was not the case in CGG: in
the present setting there is an indirect supply shock induced by the increase
in demand through the cost channel.
The fact that the Augmented NK-PC is ￿ atter than the canonical NK-
PC puzzling. After all, one would expect in￿ ation to be higher ￿ for a
given increase in output (with respect to the ￿ exprice equilibrium) ￿in the
presence of the cost channel. In order to explain the puzzle, notice that
equation (44) is the consolidation of the Augmented NK-PC as de￿ned in
equation (41) and of the IS curve (42). In the absence of shocks, a positive









CGG model. Notice that the output gap turns positive, according to (42)
only if the central bank has engineered a reduction of the real interest rate.
In the presence of the cost channel, this reduction of the real interest rate
43Figure 8: NK-PC and SEP in di⁄erent cases.










We are now ready to examine the transmission and the e⁄ects of shocks.
Suppose initially there are no shocks: gt = ut = 0. In ￿gure 8 we represent
the SEP and the Phillips curve in CGG and in the present (ABD) setting.
In the absence of shocks in both settings the two lines intersect in the origin,
point A, which is also the bliss point.




ut on impact (see point B in ￿gure 9). The central bank
reacts raising the interest rate to steer the macroeconomy on the SEP and
the new short run equilibrium will be in C. The output gap turns negative.




(once again see point B). The central bank reacts raising the interest rate
44Figure 9: E⁄ect of a supply shock
and the new short run equilibrium will be at the intersection D. Qualitatively
we have the same prescription in favour of a leaning against the wind policy
as in the standard setting.
Notice however that in the present setting the central bank is implicitly
targeting the ROS. In fact [ ROS = it￿Et￿t+1 in equilibrium (no-arbitrage).
In other words, by changing the policy rate the central bank steers the [ ROS
in such a way as to obtain a target level of [ ROS consistent with the SEP.
The quantitative impact moreover is di⁄erent. Due to the smaller slopes
of the schedules involved, in our setting the contraction induced by the
leaning against the wind policy is bigger while the e⁄ect on in￿ ation may
be smaller.
Things are more complicated and more interesting in case a demand
shock occurs. In a CGG economy, the demand shock does not a⁄ect either
45in￿ ation or the output gap because it is completely o⁄set by the central




impact (see point B in ￿gure 10). This is the indirect supply shock induced
by the increase in demand through the cost channel.16 The central bank
reacts raising the interest rate to steer the macroeconomy on the SEP. The
output gap turns negative. In our setting the SEP shifts down due to the
demand shock, making the recession more acute. This is actually lowering
in￿ ation. The short run equilibrium will be in C. In the ￿gure in￿ ation is
still positive in C.
If the SEP shifts down "enough", however, one can well have a de￿ ation,
i.e. a negative rate of growth of the price level. In appendix ...we show
that this is the case if the central banker is (relatively) conservative, i.e
^ ￿1 < ￿ < 1:
What happens to the stock price? As we said, since the system is re-
cursive we can solve for the asset price after having solved for the ouput
gap, in￿ ation and the interest rate. Suppose that ￿rms do not distribute
dividends. In this case
[ ROS = Et^ qt+1 ￿ ^ qt = ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ^ qt (47)
16Consolidating the IS and A-NKPC curves through the cost channel we have:
￿t = k￿xt + k [￿ (Etxt+1 + gt)] + ￿Et￿t+1 + ut









If we take rational expectations into account, i.e. Etxt+1 = ￿xt;Et￿t+1 = ￿￿t, we end













46Figure 10: E⁄ect of a demand shock
From the no-arbitrage condition (22) and the IS (21), moreover one gets
[ ROS = it ￿ Et￿t+1 = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)xt + gt (48)
Therefore:




In the end, therefore, we have a new schedule on the (xt; ^ qt) plane which
is upward sloping and subject to a shock. We can think of this schedule
as an Asset Price Phillips curve (AP-PC): when the output gap is positive
there will be a burst of asset price in￿ ation and viceversa. A sudden increase
of demand translates into a negative shock for the Stock market.
In order to understand why an AP-PC is implicit in our setup, let￿ s
represent equations (47) and (48) on the
￿
^ qt; [ ROS
￿
plane as in ￿gure 11.
47Figure 11: E⁄ect of a supply shock on ^ q
(47) is represented by a downward sloping straight line passing through the
origin, which represents the equilibrium (point A). If the economy is in the
￿ exprice equilibrium (xt = 0) and there are no shocks, (48) coincides with
the x-axis ([ ROS = 0 for any ^ qt).
Suppose a supply shock occurs so that the central bank steers the econ-
omy on the SEP by raising the interest rate. Hence the output gap becomes
negative. The horizontal line representing (48) shifts up.The new equilib-
rium is D: the asset price has gone down. Figure 11 should be thought of
as a complement to ￿gure 9. Points A and D in the former corresponds to
points A and D on the latter.
Suppose now a demand shock occurs so that the central bank raises the
interest rate. The output gap becomes negative. The horizontal line of
equation (48) shifts up twice ￿as shown in ￿gure 12 ￿because of the shock
48Figure 12: E⁄ects of a demand shock on ^ q
(from A to B) and because of the recession (from B to C). The asset price
has gone down.Figure 12 is a complement to ￿gure 10. Points A and C in
the former correspond to points A and C on the latter.
Substituting the solutions for xt in (49) we obtain ^ qt as a linear function
of the shocks (see again appendix D for details). It turns out that ^ q is a
linear decreasing function of g and u. Both types of shocks therefore, are
detrimental for the Stock market.
8.2 Model O-1.1: dividends and pro￿ts
So far we have not speci￿ed how ￿rms set dividends. The speci￿cation of
dividend policy allows to complete model O-1 ￿which is, as we said above,
dichotomous ￿in a satisfactory way. In section 8.1 in fact, for the sake of
discussion, we have closed the model (and derived the solution for the asset
49price) by assuming that ￿rms do not pay dividends so that the return on
shares coincides with the capital gain.
In the present section, we will derive an explicit solution for dividends
and the asset price assuming that ￿rms￿real pro￿ts are paid out to house-
holds in the form of dividends: dt = Yt ￿ wt
ZtYt:Substituting the real wage as
de￿ned in (15) into the expression above we get






























. 17We assume that the technology
shock ^ zt follows a AR(1) process ^ zt = ￿z^ zt￿1 + ~ zt, with 0 < ￿z < 1 and
e zt ￿iid(0;￿2
z). Hence dividends are an increasing linear function of the
output gap subject to a technology shock. Our complete system therefore





￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
￿(￿ + ￿)
^ qt = ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) +
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1
i
￿t = ￿xt + k
h
￿Et^ qt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Et ^ dt+1 ￿ ^ qt
i
+ ￿Et￿t+1 + ut













17Notice that ds=Ys =
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
is the s.s. share of pro￿ts in total income.
50This is "model O-1.1". If we iterate (51) one period ahead and take the
expected value we get











Substituting out it and Et ^ dt+1 from (21) and (52) into (22), we get
























In the present setting, the [ ROS becomes











The Rational Expectation of ^ qt+1 taken in t is Et^ qt+1 = ￿^ qt due to
assumption 1. This implicitly determines a mean reverting behaviour of
the asset price too. Taking model-consistent expectations into account the
expression above boils down to:







￿xt + (1 ￿ ￿)
1 + ￿
￿ + ￿
￿z^ zt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿) ^ qt
(54)
As shown in section 8.1, when ￿rms do not pay dividends [ ROS is rep-
resented by equation to (47). Equation (54) shows that, when ￿rms pay
dividends out of pro￿ts, [ ROS is not only decreasing with ^ qt (because of
the capital gain) but also increasing with xt (because of the distribution of
51dividends).
From equations (21) and (22), moreover we obtain (48), i.e. [ ROS =






















In the end, therefore, we have a new equation for the Asset Price Phillips
curve which take into accounts also dividends and the productivity shock
(compare with (49)).18 While the demand shock will have a negative impact
on the Stock market, a productivity shock will boost asset prices, ceteris
paribus.
In the case of a supply shock, the central bank steers the economy on the
SEP by raising the interest rate. The output gap becomes negative. The
horizontal line representing (48) shifts up.Pro￿ts and dividends decrease
because of the recession. Hence (??) shifts down. The new equilibrium
is D: the asset price has gone down. Figure 13 should be thought of as a
complement to ￿gure 9. Points A and D in the former corresponds to points
A and D on the latter.
Suppose now a demand shock occurs so that the central bank raises the
interest rate. The output gap becomes negative. The horizontal line of
equation (??) shifts up twice ￿as shown in ￿gure 14 ￿because of the shock
18Notice that (55) can be derived from (53) by incorporating model consistent expecta-
tions.
52Figure 13: E⁄ect of a supply shock on the asset price.
and because of the recession.
Pro￿ts and dividends decrease. (??) shifts down. Equilibrium is D: the
asset price has gone down.Figure 14 should be thought of as a complement
to ￿gure 10. Points A and D in the former corresponds to points A and D
on the latter.
Finally consider a productivity shock. The central bank does not inter-
vene because the output gap is zero (but the ￿ exprice equilibrium output
has gone up). (??) shifts up as shown in ￿gure. Equilibrium is B. The asset
price has gone up.
Another way of visualizing the impact of di⁄erent shocks consists in
simulating the impulse response function. For the sake of comparison we use
the CGG parameterization, i.e. ￿ = 4 so that ￿ = 0:25. This is admittedly
a controversial assumption but it considered somehow acceptable in the
53Figure 14: E⁄ect of a demand shock on the asset price
Figure 15: E⁄ect of a productivity shock on the asset price
54Figure 16: E⁄ects of a supply shock.
literature. As to the other parameters, we assume
k = 0:03;￿ = 2;￿ = ￿￿1;￿ = k(￿ + ￿) = 0:075
￿ = 1:2;￿ = 0:99;  = ￿ = 0:9;￿z = 0:95
The e⁄ect of a temporary supply shock is shown in ￿gure 16. The reac-
tion of the central bank is contractionary as expected. The asset price and
dividends follow the dynamic pattern of the output gap.
The impulse response function for a temporary demand shock is shown in
￿gure 17. The dynamic patterns of all the variables of interest are similar to
the ones recorded in the case a supply shock. This is not surprising because
￿as explained above ￿in the present context the demand shock plays the
role of an indirect supply shock.
As a consequence of recursive structure of the system, a temporary tech-
55Figure 17: E⁄ects of a demand shock
nology shock a⁄ects only the asset price and dividends as shown in ￿gure
18.
8.3 Model O-1.2: dividends and asset prices
In this section we will explore an alternative approach to dividends, i.e. we




where ￿ is the elasticity of dividends to asset prices.
Log-linearizing around the steady state we get: ^ dt = ￿^ qt. In this case
19Of course, the amount of dividends paid out following (56) should be no greater than
realized pro￿ts.
56Figure 18: E⁄ects of a technology shock
[ ROS becomes:
[ ROS = ￿0Et^ qt+1 ￿ ^ qt (57)
where ￿0 := ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿:
In ￿gure 19 we report the scatter diagram of dividends paid in the US
by non-farm and non-￿nancial enterprises and the Dow Jones from 1970 to
2008 on a log-log scale. In the data, the elasticity ￿ is smaller than (but
close to) one.
Using this fact, we can assume that ￿0 := ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ is positive but
smaller than one.20 Equating (57) and (48) we get:
^ qt = ￿0Et^ qt+1 + ￿(xt ￿ Etxt+1 ￿ gt) (58)
Incorporating rational expectations into the de￿nition (57) above, we
20In fact ￿
0 is a weighted average of 1 and ￿:
57Figure 19: Dividends and Stock prices
have








1 ￿ ￿￿0￿xt ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿￿0gt (60)
which is the equation of the AP-PC with this particular de￿nition of div-
idends. Qualitatively, the same discussion we have proposed at the end of
section 8.1 applies also here.
We simulate the model using the following parameters:
￿ = 0:075;￿ = 1:2;￿ = 0:99;￿ = 4;￿ = 2;k = 0:003;￿ =   = 0:9
58Figure 20: Supply shock. ￿ = 0:5
The impulse response function for a temporary supply shock is shown
in ￿gure 20. The central bank reacts to an in￿ ationary shock by raising
the interest rate. Both the output gap and the asset price go down (and
therefore also dividends decrease). Over time, all the variables converge,
albeit with a certain persistence, to the steady state.
The impulse response function for a temporary demand shock is shown
in ￿gure 21. The central bank reacts to the shock by raising the interest
rate. Contrary to the standard case, in this scenario the central bank is
unable to o⁄set completely the shock and to anchor output at the ￿ exprice
equilbrium. Both the output gap and the asset price go down (and therefore
also dividends go down). Over time, all the variables converge, albeit with
a certain persistence, to the steady state.
59Figure 21: Demand shock. ￿ = 0:5
9 The augmented in￿ ation targeting rule
From model O-0, i.e. (40)(41)(21),after some algebra (see appendix E for
details), we get the optimal expectations based monetary policy rule:
it = ￿￿Et￿t+1 + ￿xEtxt+1 + ￿uut + ￿ggt (61)
where
















￿k + (￿ + ￿)
￿1






Assumption 5: We assume that
￿ > ^ ￿0 := ￿ (￿ + ￿)
￿1 ￿ ￿ (￿ + ￿)k2 (62)
Recalling that ￿ = 1=￿ and ￿ = k(￿ + ￿) it is easy to verify that (62)
implies 1 > ￿A0:Hence assumption 5 assures that the response of the interest
rate to a policy shock goes in the familiar direction (￿x > 0;￿u > 0;￿g > 0)
and ￿￿ > 0:
It is interesting to note that 62 is satis￿ed if the central banker is not
"too conservative", i.e. if the aversion to output dispersion is high enough,
greater than a threshold ^ ￿0 which is in turn a function of k, the sensitivity
of in￿ ation to the cost channel: In ￿gure 9, the condition is ful￿lled for all
the points of the (k;￿) plane above the curve. Notice that for relatively
high values of k this condition is always satis￿ed.












^ ￿0 as a function of k
If we "translate" Etxt+1 into a function of expectations of in￿ ation (see
again appendix E for details) we obtain
it = ￿￿Et￿t+1 + ￿0
￿Et￿t+2 + ￿uut + ￿ggt (63)
where
￿￿ = 1 +
 
￿￿
￿ + ￿2 ￿





















￿g = (￿ ￿ A0)
￿1
62Equation (63) is the optimal augmented in￿ation targeting rule ac-
cording to which the central bank should respond to changes in the in￿ ation
expectations (formed in t) not only for t+1 but also for t+2.
In order to discuss the response of the central bank to expectations and
shocks we focus ￿rst on the expression (￿ ￿ A0)
￿1 which is the response
￿g of the policy rate to a demand shock and shows up in all the other
coe¢ cients of the in￿ ation targeting rule. Notice that ￿g > 0 if ￿ > A0
which is satis￿ed if we adopt assumption 5, i.e. if the central banker is
su¢ ciently "accommodating".
This is puzzling: the central banker should be "wet" (enough) for the
policy rate to increase in response to a demand shock ￿i.e. for ￿g to be pos-
itive. Even when ￿g > 0, moreover, in this model the central bank responds
less aggressively to a demand shock than in the standard New Keynesian
setting ￿such as in Clarida-Gal￿-Gertler ￿where ￿CGG
g = ￿￿1. However, the
rationale for this is clear. When a demand shock hits the economy, in fact,
the attempt of the central bank to stabilize output by increasing the interest
rate translates into an (indirect) supply shock ￿through the cost channel ￿
that boosts in￿ ation. A conservative central banker would "￿ght" against
this in￿ ation shock by raising the policy rate less than an accommodating
central banker exactly because the former is more concerned with in￿ ation
than the latter.
The response of the central banker to expectations of in￿ ation one period
ahead ￿￿ can well be smaller than 1. As to the response of the central bank
to expectations of in￿ ation two periods ahead, it is worth noting that ￿0
￿is
positive, i.e. the policy rate increases in response to Et￿t+2 if ￿ > 1.
6310 Instrument rule vs. optimal monetary policy
We are now in a position to sum up the discussion of monetary policy so
far. We have basically three regimes:
￿ an instrument rule with no-reaction to asset prices (IR-NAP),
￿ an instrument rule with reaction to asset prices (IR-RAP)
￿ an optimal monetary policy rule (OR) which, by construction, does
not respond to asset prices.
In the case of a supply shock, the policy prescription and the transmission
mechanism is the same both in the IR and OR regimes. The central bank
reacts by raising the interest rate, asset prices fall, the output gap turns
negative, the return on shares increases (even if dividends fall both in case
dividends are linked to output through pro￿ts and in case they are linked
to the asset price through the asset price elasticity). The magnitude of the
e⁄ect, however, is indeed di⁄erent. When it takes into account asset price
changes ￿i.e. in the IR-RAP case ￿the central bank usually mitigates the
impact on price and quantity of its contractionary policy in a instrument rule
setting. The IR-RAP regime, therefore, is characterized by milder variations
in in￿ ation and output. In the asymptotic case of an in￿nite reaction to asset
prices, the policy prescription and the transmission mechanism are the same
as in a CGG economy without cost channel.
Things are more complicated and more interesting in the case of a de-
mand shock. To compare the e⁄ects of a demand shock in the IR and OR
cases, notice ￿rst that the Augmented NK-PC of equation (44), being the
64consolidation of the Augmented NK-PC as de￿ned in equation (41) and of
the IS curve (42), can be employed not only in the OR case (as we have
done in section 8) but also in the IR case. In the IR case, the intersection
between the AD and AS schedules should lie on the Augmented NK-PC.
In order to avoid messy diagrams, suppose for the sake of the argument
that the SEP of equation (43) and the AD curve (in the IR-NAP case) of
equation (27) are graphically coincident. In other words, by a ￿ uke the
slopes of the downward sloping loci on the (x;￿) plane in the OR setting
(i.e. the SEP) and in the IR context (i.e. the AD curve) are the same. A
demand shock shifts the AD curve up (see the dashed downward sloping
black line) but the SEP down (see the dotted downward sloping line), as
shown in ￿gure 22. Moreover, the Augmented NK-PC of equation (44) wil
shift up (see the dotted upward sloping line). The new short run equilibrium
will be B in the IR case and C in the OR case.
Hence the same (demand) shock has opposite e⁄ects on the output gap.
In the IR regime, it has a positive e⁄ect ￿as we are accustomed to think in a
standard short run macro setting ￿while in the OR regime it has a negative
e⁄ect. In the latter case, in fact, the downward sloping locus ￿i.e. the SEP
￿incorporates the attempt of the central bank to to stabilize output and
in￿ ation in a setting characterized by the presence of a cost channel. The
contractionary reaction of the central bank to the shock translates into a
downward shift of the locus.
When the central bank takes into account also asset prices, i.e. is in the
IR-RAP case characterized by (q) in the ￿gure, the new short run equilib-
rium will be in B(q). Of course both B and B(q) lie on the new Augmented
65Figure 22: E⁄ects of a demand shock in the IR and OR cases
NK-PC. Output grows more than in the IR-NAP case but in￿ ation will be
milder.
11 Learning
An interesting research question we want to answer is whether the properties
of the basic NK model change ￿in terms of determinacy and learnability of
the RE equilibrium ￿once we introduce asset prices through a cost channel.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) introduce asset prices in an augmented Taylor
rule (but not in the structural equations for supply and demand in the econ-
omy). They show that in this case indeterminacy is more likely. Airaudo et
al. (2007), instead, introduce asset prices in the demand side of the economy
through a wealth e⁄ect and ￿nd that a central bank that responds to ex-
66pected stock prices can induce multiple sunspot-driven equilibria. Moreover
E-instability of the fundamental equilibrium is more likely.
In order to explore this issue we start from the system
yt = AEtyt+1 + Bwt (64)
where matrices A and B will depend on the speci￿c policy rule adopted, yt
is the vector of state variables and wt is the vector of exogenous shocks. We
write the agents￿Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) in matrix form as follows
yt = Hwt
Hence the Actual Law of Motion (ALM) is
yt = (AHF + B)wt
where F is the (diagonal) matrix of autoregressive parameters for the shocks.
This set-up implies the following map from PLM to ALM
_ H = AHF + B ￿ H (65)
whose ￿x point ( ￿ H) represents the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE).
REE is E-stable if the matrix di⁄erential equation (65) is locally stable at
￿ H:
To evaluate stability, we have to vectorize the matrix di⁄erental equation
67and derive its Jacobian
J =
￿
F0 ￿ A ￿ I
￿
: (66)
The REE is E-stable i⁄ the eigenvalues of J have all negative real parts.
We analyze determinacy and E-stability under two alternative policy
rules, the Fundamentals based and the Expectations based policy rule.
11.1 Model O-1.1
In the REE solution of model O-0 xt;￿t;it are linear functions of the shocks
as shown in appendix D.1. The solution for it takes the form:
it = ￿uut + ￿ggt + ￿z^ zt (67)
where ￿i;i = u;g are functions of the structural parameters and ￿z =
0:This is the fundamentals based optimal interest rate rule. The same rule
applies to both model O-1.1 and O-1.2.
In the case of model O-1.1 we get the solution for ^ qt as a linear function
of the shocks (demand, supply, productivity) from the Asset Price Phillips
schedule (55) (see appendix D.3).
In order to evaluate determinacy and E-stability, we use the fundamen-
tals based policy rule (67) to substitute out it from the system consisting of
the IS curve (21), Augmented New Keynesian Phillips curve (24) and Asset
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Since none of the variables are predetermined, determinacy requires all
the eigenvalues of A to be within the unit circle. Finding the eigenvalues
requires to ￿nd the roots of the characteristic polynomial, which is of 3rd
degree. Not much can be said analytically, so we calibrate the model and
solve numerically. For the parameters in the standard NK model, we use the
parameterization suggested by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000)21.E-stability
requires the negative part of all eigenvalues of matrix J as de￿ned in (66)to
be negative.
Numerical results with the parameterization chosen show that the MSV
REE is indeterminate and not learnable (E-unstable). This result is consis-
tent with what found previously in the literature (see Evans and Honkapo-
21We also check the robustness of our results by considering the alternative calibrations
suggested by McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Woodford (1999).
69hja, 2003). In this sense, asset prices do not help solve the problem of in-
determinacy of equilibria in the model when an optimal fundamental based
policy rule is implemented by the central bank.
We move therefore to the analysis with the Expectations based rule. In
order to ￿nd it, we use (40)(41)(21) to express it in terms of expectations
only. We obtain:










































as shown in appendix E. Note that the Expectations based rule does not
respond to expected future asset price, but only to expected output and
in￿ ation. This is due to the dichotomy inherent in the system.
Using policy rule (68) to solve out it we obtain a 3-dimensional system







1 ￿ ￿￿x ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) 0
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿x) + k￿x ￿ + (￿￿ ￿ k)(1 ￿ ￿￿) 0
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With the same parameterization chosen above, numerical results show
that when an expectations based policy is employed the MSV REE is deter-
minate and learnable (E-stable). This outcome is consistent with previous
￿ndings that an expectations based rule can help to solve the problem of
indeterminacy.
11.2 Model O-1.2
The REE for xt;￿t;it are the same as in the case of model O-1.1 because they
are derived as solutions of model O-0 as shown in appendix D.1. Therefore
also the fundamentals based rule is the same.
In the case of model O-1.2 we get the solution for ^ qt as a linear function
of the shocks (demand, supply) from the Asset Price Phillips schedule (60)
(see appendix D.4).
Using the fundamentals based policy rule:it = ￿uut + ￿ggt to substitute
out it from the system consisting of the IS curve (21), Augmented New
Keynesian Phillips curve (24) and Asset Price Phillips curve (58) we obtain
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Numerical results with the parameterization chosen show that the MSV
REE is indeterminate and not learnable (E-unstable).
Following the same procedure as before, we ￿nd the Expectations based
rule, which is the same as (68). We obtain therefore the 3-dimensional







1 ￿ ￿￿x ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) 0
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿x) + k￿x ￿ + (￿￿ ￿ k)(1 ￿ ￿￿) 0











￿￿￿u ￿￿￿g + 1







The numerical analysis shows that the MSV REE is determinate and
learnable (E-stable) when an expectations based policy is employed.
Finally, in the particular case in which the ￿rm does not pay dividends,
72[ ROS = Et^ qt+1 ￿ ^ qt, from the numerical results we infer that the MSV REE
is indeterminate and non-learnable (E-unstable) when using a fundamentals
based policy rule,while if an expectations based policy rule is employed we
￿nd that the MSV REE is still indeterminate but it becomes learnable (E-
stable).
In the present setting therefore we ￿nd that calibrating the model ￿ la
Clarida, Gali and Gertler, the REE solution is indeterminate and E-unstable
when a fundamentals based policy rule is implemented ￿whatever approach
we use to modelling dividends ￿while it generally becomes both determinate
and stable if we use an expectations based rule. There is in fact one notable
exception: In the no-dividend case, the problem of indeterminacy cannot be
overcome by resorting to the expectations based rule (see table 1).
Table 1: Properties of the RE solution

















In this paper we have presented a NK-DSGE model in which asset prices will
be eventually incorporated into the NK Phillips curve. This is due to the
assumption of a cost channel for monetary policy which is activated when-
ever monetary policy a⁄ects asset prices and therefore the return on shares.
The latter in fact is the cost of external ￿nance in our model. The novelty of
the analysis consists in this peculiar treatment of ￿nancing decisions, which
brings to the fore the relationship between pricing of goods and pricing of
assets.
We analyse three monetary policy regimes:(a) an instrument rule with
no-reaction to asset prices (IR-NAP), (b) an instrument rule with reaction
to asset prices (IR-RAP) and (c) an optimal monetary policy rule (OR).
In the case of a supply shock, the policy prescription and the transmission
mechanism are qualitatively the same both with an instrument rule and with
in an optimal monetary policy setting. The results are more complicated
but also more interesting in the case of a demand shock, which has opposite
e⁄ects on the output gap. In the IR regime, it has a positive e⁄ect while in
the OR regime it has a negative e⁄ect. In the IR-RAP case, output grows
more than in the IR-NAP case but in￿ ation will be lower.
We consider these results encouraging even if this is a very preliminary
exploration of the properties of the model. We want to pursue an appro-
priate generalization because the model has to be enriched to explore more
realistic environments. The most straightforward extension will consist in
incorporating credit markets and credit market imperfections because they
74have a major role to play in our "story". The list of possible extensions that
one can imagine, however, is quite long and will ￿gure on top of our research
agenda in the near future.
75A The household￿ s maximization problem





















subject to a sequence of budget constraints de￿ned as it follows:































￿s￿t+s [Ct+s + mt+s + bt+s + At+sqt+s+







￿ qt+sAt￿1+s ￿ dt+sAt￿1+s]
Solving the above problem we get the following FOCs that hold 8t:
@L
@Ct
= 0 =) C￿￿
t ￿ ￿t = 0
@L
@mt
= 0 =) ￿ (mt)






= 0 =) ￿￿N
￿
t + ￿twt = 0
@L
@At
= 0 =) ￿￿tqt + ￿￿t+1 (Etqt+1 + Etdt+1) = 0
@L
@bt




76From the above conditions we get the the Euler equations (4)(5)(6) and
the asset price equation (7) as de￿ned in section 2.
B Model I-1
We proceed to the solution of model I-0, which boils down to equations
(27) and (28) by the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. We "guess" the
following:
xt = a1ut + a2gt
￿t = b1ut + b2gt
So that, under assumption 1,
Etxt+1 = ￿(a1ut + a2gt)
Et￿t+1 = ￿(b1ut + b2gt)
After some algebra we verify that the conjecture is indeed correct and














K0 := (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) +
k
￿
(￿￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿)
Under assumption 2 it turns out that K0 > 0 and a1 < 0;a2 > 0;b1 >
0;b2 > 0.
The coe¢ cients for the fundamentals based interest rate rule:
it = ￿uut + ￿ugt
can be computed as follows: ￿u = ￿￿b1 > 0;￿g = ￿￿b2 > 0:
Finally, from (32) follows that, under the special case of no-dividends,

















Therefore c1 < 0;c2 < 0:This completes the solution of model I-1.
The canonical model (without the cost channel) M I-0(c) consists of


















K1 := (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) +
k
￿
(￿￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿)
The coe¢ cients have the same sign as the corresponding coe¢ cients of the






The coe¢ cients for the fundamentals based interest rate rule are: ￿u =
￿￿bc
1 > 0;￿g = ￿￿bc
2 > 0:Finally, from (32) follows that, under the spe-





2gt). This completes the
solution of model I-1(c).
C Model I-2
In order to ￿nd the RE solution of model I-2bis we "guess" the following:
xt = a1ut + a2gt
￿t = b1ut + b2gt
^ qt = c1ut + c2gt
So that, under assumption 1,
Etxt+1 = ￿(a1ut + a2gt)
Et￿t+1 = ￿(b1ut + b2gt)
Et^ qt+1 = ￿(c1ut + c2gt)
After some algebra we verify that the conjecture is indeed correct and





(1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ k(￿￿ ￿ ￿)] + ￿q (1 ￿ ￿￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)K2
b1 =



























K2 := (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿





(￿￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿)
Under assumption 3 it turns out that K2 > 0 and a1 < 0;a2 > 0;b1 >
0;b2 > 0;c1 < 0;c2 < 0.
We can determine the coe¢ cients for the interest rate in the fundamen-
tals based rule:
it = ￿uut + ￿ugt
as follows: ￿u = ￿￿b1 + ￿qc1;￿g = ￿￿b2 + ￿qc2￿g: Using the expressions
80above for bi and ci i = 1;2 we get:
￿u =












This completes the solution of model I-2.
D Model O-1
D.1 Model O-0
We proceed to the solution of model O-0, which boils down to equations
(43) and (44) by the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. We "guess" the
following:
xt = a1ut + a2gt
￿t = b1ut + b2gt
so that, under assumption 1,
Etxt+1 = ￿(a1ut + a2gt)
Et￿t+1 = ￿(b1ut + b2gt)
After some algebra we verify that the conjecture is indeed correct and
we get the following solutions:
81a1 = ￿
￿(￿ + ￿)





￿2 (￿ + ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)





(1 ￿ ￿￿)K3 + ￿2 (￿ + ￿￿)
b2 =
k￿ (￿ + ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
(1 ￿ ￿￿)K3 + ￿2 (￿ + ￿￿)
where
K3 := ￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)




a1 < 0;a2 < 0;b1 > 0;b2 > 0 if ￿ > 1 and viceversa.
Recall that
it = ￿￿t ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)xt + ￿g
Therefore, the coe¢ cients for the fundamentals based optimal interest rate
rule:
it = ￿uut + ￿ugt
can be computed as follows:
￿u = ￿b1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)a1
￿g = ￿b2 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)a2 + ￿
It turns out that ￿u > 0;￿g > 0:
82D.2 No dividends
From (49) follows that, under the special case of no-dividends, the solution
for ^ qt is ^ qt = c1ut + c2gt where
c1 = ￿a1
c2 = ￿a2 ￿
1
1 ￿ ￿
Therefore c1 < 0;c2 < 0:This completes the solution of model O-1 in the no
dividends case.
D.3 Model O-1.1
In order to ￿nd the solution of model O-1.1 we guess
xt = a1ut + a2gt + a3^ zt
￿t = b1ut + b2gt + b3^ zt
^ qt = c1ut + c2gt + c3^ zt
Since the system is recursive, ai;biwith i = f1;2g are the same as in model
O-0 (see above) and a3 = b3 = 0.
From (55) follows that the solution for ^ qt is ^ qt = c1ut + c2gt where
c1 =










￿￿z + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿z)
1 ￿ ￿￿z
a3 +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)
(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿z)
￿z












In order to ￿nd the solution of model O-1.2 we guess
xt = a1ut + a2gt
￿t = b1ut + b2gt
^ qt = c1ut + c2gt







1 ￿ ￿￿0 [(1 ￿ ￿)a2 ￿ 1]
E The expectations based rule
The system consists of equations (40)(41)(21), which we reproduce here for







￿t = ￿xt + k(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + ￿Et￿t+1 + ut
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + gt
Solving the ￿rst 2 equations we get:
84xt = ￿A0it + A1Et￿t+1 ￿ A2ut (69)
and
￿t = A3it + A4Et￿t+1 + A5ut (70)
where
A0 =




￿￿(￿ ￿ k) + (￿ + ￿)
￿1
￿ + ￿2 =
￿￿￿













In order to derive the expectations based rule we plug (69) into the IS
curve (21). After rearranging we obtain:
it = ￿￿Et￿t+1 + ￿xEtxt+1 + ￿uut + ￿ggt
85where















and 1 ￿ ￿A0 > 0 provided ￿ >
￿k+(￿+￿)￿1
￿+￿2 :
In order to obtain the optimal in￿ ation targeting rule, we update (69),
take the expectation and using the law of iterated projections and recalling
that Etut+1 = ￿ut we get:
Etxt+1 = ￿A0Etit+1 + A1Et￿t+2 ￿ A2￿ut
We can retrieve Etit+1 from (70), taking the expectation and using the





























Substituting (69) and (71) into (??) and solving for it yields:
it = ￿￿Et￿t+1 + ￿0
￿Et￿t+2 + ￿uut + ￿ggt
86where
￿￿ = 1 +
 
￿￿
￿ + ￿2 ￿
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